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China p e r s p e c t i v e s Current affairs
This section, prepared by Asia Centre (www.centreasia.eu) is mainly based on 
the Chinese-language press and aims at explaining the debates ongoing in 
the PRC, at Hong Kong or in Taiwan on international questions and issues
related to Greater China.
Reforming China’s Criminal
Procedure Law
Analysis by Hugo Winckler based on:
– Wang Jianxun, “The provisions of the reform of criminal procedural law legalising secret investigations are a step backwards,” Caijing
wang, 5 September 2011. (1)
– Chen Youxi, “The legalisation of secret investigations is an important violation of political integrity,” Zhongguo wangluo dianshitai –
CNTV web site, Opinion section, 27 November 2011. (2)
– Wu Zhehua, “Chen Weidong discusses reform of the criminal procedure law: Behind each article there is a story,” Zhongguoguangbo
wang, 8 March 2012. (3)
– Chen Guangzhong, “The provisions of the great reform of [China’s] criminal procedure law represent progress,” Jinghua Shibao – Beijing
Times, 9 March 2012. (4)
– Xie Doudou, Wang Heyan, “The vicissitudes of the clause on secret detention,” Caixin wang, 12 March 2012. (5)
– “A focus on the great reform of criminal procedure law: Important perspectives on the ‘little constitution’,” Banyuetan wang, 13 March
2012. (6)
– Li Xiangning and Xu Kai, “Criminal procedure law amendment passes amid controversy,” Caijing, 25 March 2012. (7)
– Yao Dongxing, “Behind the scenes of the ‘great reform’: Four protagonists’ narratives about ten years of power games,” Zhongguo jingji
zhoukan – China Economic Weekly, 27 March 2012. (8)
On 14 March 2012, the PRC adopted a draft amendment to its crim-inal procedure law (CPL), bringing an end to a process of reformbegun in 2009. In that year, the National People’s Congress created
a task force to conduct a national survey on the proposed amendment. This
committee interviewed legal professionals from all levels of the judicial sys-
tem, and in doing so began a wide-ranging debate on legal reform. The re-
vised law will enter into force on 1 January 2013, and the consultative
process involved in its preparation shows that China’s political leadership
wants to be seen as listening to the people.
Over the last few years, the Chinese media have carried news of a series
of highly publicised criminal cases. Yao Dongxing says that the public was
allowed to express opinions on each of these cases and that people took
an active interest in the legal proceedings. Wang Jianxun says the use of
illegal methods to collect evidence led to several unfair convictions
(yuancuo anjian 冤错案件). These miscarriages of justice caused a public
outcry and a dramatic drop in confidence in the authorities. The crisis of
confidence in the judicial system is frequently discussed in the Chinese
media. The way the amendment to the CPL was presented to the public
was therefore as important as its substance: reform was seen as a step
towards regaining public confidence. This meant the Chinese press had
an important role to play in explaining and justifying the new law. The
framers of the law hoped to find a balance between giving concessions
to the public and maintaining the judicial system as a tool of control
over Chinese society.
A new discourse on criminal procedure law
The media coverage of the new law shows a shift in perspective on the
role of criminal procedure law in China. The CPL is no longer presented as a
tool of the authorities for bringing criminals to justice. Instead, the law is
described as guaranteeing individuals’ fundamental freedoms, but with a
necessary trade-off between respect for those freedoms and the require-
ments of justice. This conception of the spirit of the CPL is very different
from the Maoist interpretation. The transition took place in stages. The CPL
was enacted in 1976 and amended for the first time in 1996. The 2012 re-
form will be its second revision. Yao Dongxing says the evolution of the CPL
reflects increasing public awareness of fundamental individual freedoms.
Including individual rights in the text made the CPL a “mini-constitution”
(xiaoxianfa 小宪法). This is a real breakthrough, since judicial application of
1. Wang Jianxun is associate professor of law at China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL)
in Beijing.
2. Chen Youxi is a well-known lawyer famous for his defence of Li Zhuang, a lawyer from the city of
Chongqing who faced criminal charges while defending a local mafia boss. For more details about
this affair, see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The implication of the Chongqing Model for the reform of
China’s legal system,” China Analysis, November 2011.
3. Chen Weidong is professor of law at Renmin University of China (RUC).
4. Chen Guangzhong is a law professor who is considered to be one of the founding fathers of mod-
ern criminal procedure law in China.
5. Xie Doudou and Wang Heyan are both journalists for Caixin.
6. This article contains a series of opinions from people who participated in the reform.
7. Li Xiangning and Xu Kai are both journalists for Caijing
8. Yao Dongxing is a journalist at Zhongguo jingji zhoukan.
constitutional provisions remains limited and uncertain, and unlike a con-
stitution, the CPL is fixed and is applied every day in all criminal cases at
every level of the judicial system.
All of the authors say that by reaffirming the basic rights of the individual,
the CPL sets a limit on the powers of government and a limit to the use of
public power. The CPL is less concerned with investigating, pursuing, and
judging criminals than with avoiding abuses of power. Its objective is to bal-
ance the administration’s right to use legitimate force with the right of in-
dividuals to have their fundamental liberties respected. Since this idealised
balance between protection and repression is in practice impossible, the de-
bate has centred on the best type of reform. Commentators talking about
the CPL are increasingly speaking up for telling the truth about the protec-
tion of liberties in the constitution, whether they genuinely support this
sort of openness or not. Most of the articles written in support of the reform
are intended to inform people about the amendment rather than to analyse
it. The writers explain the role of the CPL in protecting the individual and
try to inspire renewed confidence in the judicial system. The amended law
is described as “a great reform,” and its results are presented in such a way
as to gain public support.
Under the CPL, however, the legal system is split in two. In some (mostly)
serious criminal offences, such as organised crime and terrorism, civil liberty
protections do not apply. Commentators disagree about the rationale for
this dual-speed regime and are concerned about the scope of the cases in
which civil liberties can be ignored.
The initial stages of debate
The first stage of the reform process began in 2009 and resulted in two
draft proposals. From the very beginning, intellectuals – mainly lawyers from
the universities and the courts – expressed their opinions and their fears
about the draft proposals on the Internet and in the press. These commen-
tators provide a legal perspective on the law’s deficiencies and its risks of
infringing on basic freedoms. They could have been even harsher in their
criticism; they could have spoken out against the government or denounced
the cases of abuse that were reported in the media. But the legal commen-
tators stuck to discussing the proposals in terms of their legal merits and
highlighting the risk of abuse of constitutional guarantees. Chen Youxi’s ar-
ticle is a good example of this kind of criticism. He is disappointed that the
law has retained provisions giving extraordinary powers of investigation to
the administration. He says that this in effect legalises covert investigations
and secret detention.
Covert investigation and secret detention
Some of the most controversial provisions in the law concern covert inves-
tigations (mimi zhencha 秘密侦察) and secret detention (mimi juliu 祕密拘
留). These methods were both in place before the law was written, so they
had precedent in practice and basis in law. The reform legislated for both
covert investigation and secret detention, and so ensured their continued ex-
istence – but at the same time, it exposed these practices to public scrutiny.
Covert investigation involves using technology to gather evidence (jishu
zhencha 技术侦察). This includes bugging for sound, phone tapping, and in-
tercepting private mail and email. The first draft of the amendment gave a
very broad definition of the conditions under which this kind of surveillance
would be allowed. The law states that covert investigation can be used “in
any other serious offence affecting society” (qita yanzhong weihai shehui
de fanzui 其他严重危害社会的犯罪). Chen Youxi points out that this provi-
sion means covert surveillance could potentially be used under any circum-
stances. Criticism made no difference, however: the final draft included the
provision as it appeared in the first draft. The police can use technological
surveillance at their discretion, which seriously compromises the individual’s
right to privacy.
The provisions on detention were equally contentious. Article 73 of the
revised law, also known as the “extra-legal detention clause,” says a suspect
can be placed in a location other than his home without that location hav-
ing to be officially designated as a detention centre. Article 83, also called
the “secret arrest clause,” says the detainee’s relatives must be informed
within 24 hours of the suspect’s detention, unless informing them would
impede the investigation or they cannot be located. The first draft of the
revised law said Article 83 could be applied in cases of “criminal acts that
threaten national security (weihai guojia anquan fanzui 危害国家安全犯罪
,), terrorist activities (kongbu huodong fanzui恐怖活动犯罪), risk of impeding
the investigation (keneng you’ai zhencha 可能有碍侦查).” In this version,
there were three cases in which secret arrests could be made. But in the
final draft, a comma was deleted between “terrorist activities” and “risk of
impeding the investigation.”
Thus the three exceptions in which relatives did not have to be informed
were reduced to two. The third exception, “risk of impeding the investiga-
tion,” was neutralised and became just a complement to the other two, as
Xie Doudou and Wang Heyan say. Chen Guangzhong says that this revision
meant the removal of the exception to informing a suspects’ relatives within
24 hours where a risk of impeding an investigation was deemed to exist.
Secret detention is therefore still allowed, but only within limits – it is only
acceptable in cases that represent a threat to national security or in inves-
tigating acts of terrorism, and only when dictated by the requirements of
the investigation. This example shows that the debate did lead to substan-
tive modifications to the final draft, even if it did not get rid of all the con-
troversial provisions.
The death penalty
The law’s critics did not argue for removal of the death sentence, but there
was considerable debate over the procedural safeguards needed in capital
trials. The main issue was an amendment to the law that says that if an ap-
peal to a death sentence is registered, the Supreme Court “may” hear the
accused. The debate led to a change in the draft legislation that replaced
“may” (keyi 可以) with “should” (yingdang 应当). This gives people who have
been sentenced to death one last chance to explain the circumstances of
their case or to plead their innocence. The change illustrates the negotiation
process that went on during the drafting of the amendment. Wu Zhehua
says the Supreme People’s Court was not initially in favour of the provision,
but the length of the debate and the number of people arguing for the
change made them reconsider, and the amendment was adopted.
Power games between state organs
Throughout the discussion process and in the presentation of the final
draft of the law, the authorities showed a clear desire to communicate and
educate and a genuine will to advance human rights. Public opinion was
taken into account through the interviews conducted by the working com-
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mittee with members of the legal profession. Participation in the actual re-
form discussions was limited mainly to national and local experts, however,
and the general public was not consulted. As Li Xiangning and Xu Kai wrote
in Caijing and Yao Dongxing said in Zhongguo jingji zhoukan, the bulk of
the legislative process was focused on power games between different state
organs: the Supreme Court, the legislature, the Ministry of Public Security,
the public prosecutors, the Ministry of Justice, and other branches of gov-
ernment. The official narrative of reform emphasised public participation,
but the real debate took place mostly at the state level. However, the reform
committee did at least involve stakeholders in the judicial system in the
formulation of reform.
The Ministry of Public Security was quick to get involved in the debate,
issuing a series of proposals that were mainly aimed at strengthening the
powers of the police. Not all of these proposals were adopted. Li Xiangning
and Xu Kai say that no state organ managed to take complete control of
the process, and the final version was a compromise between the viewpoints
of the legislature (lifa bumen 立法部门), the judiciary, and the police (sifa
zhifa bumen 司法执法部门). Their dialogue showed they recognised “the
logic of negotiation” (tanpan de luoji 谈判的逻辑). Debate did take place
among various public actors, but few of them were outside state organs;
experts were really only consulted in an advisory capacity.
The conclusion of the reform process saw the end of the debate. Critical
articles were published only while the law was still under discussion. Articles
published after the adoption of the law ignored any remaining misgivings,
and instead mostly highlighted the advances made in protecting fundamen-
tal freedoms.
z Translated by Elizabeth Laederich.
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Local governments under pressure:
The commodification of stability
maintenance
Analysis by Jérôme Doyon based on:
– Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao, “The stability maintaining machine,” Caijing, 6 June 2011. (1)
– Zhong Weijun, “The ‘zero-incident’ logic of local governments in maintaining stability: An analytical framework,” Zhejiang shehui kexue –
Zhejiang social sciences, no. 9, September 2011. (2)
– Gao Jun, “The trap of maintaining stability and how to avoid it,” Lilun daokan, no. 11, 2011. (3)
– Xia Nan, “The alienation of weiwen,” Caijing, 12 October 2011. (4)
– Zhang Qianfan, “The origin and disruption of the system for petitioning the higher authorities,” Tansuo yu zhengming – Exploration and
free views, 10 May 2012. (5)
In 1994, the Chinese government carried out a tax reform that limitedthe revenues of local governments and made them dependent for fund-ing on central authorities. Since then, local governments have been
caught between the people, who want more social policies that local au-
thorities cannot afford, and the central government, which is focused on
maintaining social stability. Xu Kai, Li Wei’ao, and Xi Nan say that social sta-
bility has become the main priority of local governments. So, for example,
in Yun’an district in the province of Guangdong, out of 6,700 people on the
public authorities’ payroll, 1,800 have jobs related to maintaining stability.
The success of local administrations is evaluated largely on their ability
to maintain social stability. In 2009, “The temporary provision on the en-
forcement of the responsibilities of Party leaders and the State” (guanyu
shixing dangzheng lingdao ganbu wenze de zanxing guiding 关于实行党政
领导干部问责的暂行规定) reaffirmed local government’s responsibility for
incidents that threaten stability, with particular reference to riots and other
mass demonstrations. These articles show that this method of evaluation
puts pressure on local governments. The central authorities have said that
they want to develop the system of “letters and visits” (xinfang 信访), as
reaffirmed in 2005’s “Regulations on letters and visits” (xinfang tiaoli 信访
条例). This administrative practice, which exists parallel to the judiciary sys-
tem, allows citizens to appeal local decisions by presenting a petition to
central authorities. But evaluating local administrations on the basis of so-
cial stability maintenance undermines the system of letters and visits.
In order to appear to be making progress on social stability, local govern-
ments have adopted a logic of “zero incidents” (buchushi luoji 不出事逻辑). (6)
Whatever the cost, they have to make sure they present an image of sta-
bility – even at the risk of not addressing the root causes of various prob-
1. Xu Kai and Li Wei’ao are journalists at Caijing.
2. Zhong Weijun is an associate professor at the School of Political Science and Public Management
at the Zheijiang Institute of Technology.
3. Gao Jun is a professor at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at Jiangsu Teachers Uni-
versity of Technology.
4. Xia Nan is a lawyer in the Beijing law firm, Hua Yi.
5. Zhang Qianfan is a professor at Peking University Law School.
6. Zhong Weijun attributes this concept to He Xuefeng and Liu Yue. See He Xuefeng and Liu Yue,
“The ‘zero-incident’ logic in local management,” Xueshu yanjiu – Academic research, no. 6, June
2010.
